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[Crim. No. 11947.

In Bank.

July 16, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GARY LYNN
MARSHALL, Defendant and Appellant.

)

[1] Arrest-Without Warrant-Making Arrest-Making Known
Official Character.-By persistently knocking, demanding entry, and identifying themselves for several minutes before
picking a lock and entering an apartment in which they had
reasonable grounds to believe an arrestee to be, police officers
substantially complied with the notice requirements of Pen.
Code, § 844, providing that to make an arrest, a peace officer
may break open the door or window of the house in which the
officer has reasonable grounds for believing the person to be
arrested to be, after having demanded admittance, and explaining the purpose for which it is desired.
[2] Id.-Without Warrant-Making Arrest-Making Known Official Character.-In a marijuana prosecution, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that police officers
reasonably believed that defendant was in an apartment which
they forcibly entered, where an informant had so advised
them, where, although after the informant returned and before the officers entered they did not eonstantly watch the
apartment, the informant had told them that defendant was
planning to leave to attend a party, and the apartment was
dark and quiet, there was testimony that the apartment entrance was visible from the squad car and that one or more
officers were always in the car before the entry; where the
informant did not tell the officers when defendant was planning to leave and they saw no one leave the apartment which
was dark when they first arrived as well as when they
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[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Rev., Arrest, § 49; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 87
et seq.
ldcK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arrest, § 14; [3] Searches and
Seizures, § 41; [4, 9, ]3] Searches and Seizures, § 29; [5] Searches
and Seizures, § 20; [6] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [7, 8] Searches
and Seizures, §36; [10] S('ar(·1-(,8 and Seizures, §24; [11, 12]
Searches and Seizures, § 28; [14] Poisons, § 15(3).

.

.
;

52

[S]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]
\

PEOPLE

1).

MARSHALL

entered it; and where the officers believed that defendant was
hiding inside.
Searches and Seizures-Remedies for Wrongful Search and
Seizure-Burden of Proof.-The burden of proof is on the
prosecution to justify a seizure of evidence without a warrant.
Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Premises.-During a lawful search of premises for persons believed
to be in hiding, police officers may seize contraband evidence
"in plain sight."
lel. - Without Warrant - What Constitutes Unreasonable
Search.-However strongly convinced police officers may be
that a search will reveal contraband, their belief, whether
based on a sense of smell or other sources, does not justify a
search without a warrant; thus a search withont warrant by
police officers lawfully on a premises in connection with an
arrest was not justified by the odor of marijuana emanating
from a closed brown paper bag that was in an open box in an
open closet, nor was the marijuana in plain view of the officer
to justify its seizure, wherc it was in cellophane-type bags
thllt were in the paper bag.
Id.-Investigations Falling Short of Search.-When officers
seek to justify a seizure without a warrant on the ground that
no search was involved, the objects 80 seized must have been
in the. plain view of an officer who had a right to be in the
position to have that view, and must have been "fully disclosed and open to the eye and hand."
ld.-Without Warrant-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter-When
Search Warrant Required.-A plain view of simply suspicious
looking or unusual objects does not justify their seizure without a warrant; thus a search of a brown paper bag was required to disclose its contents, though there was the odor of
marijuana emanating therefrom, lllaking a search warrant
necessary before the marijuana could be seized, where the
paper bag itself was not contraband, where it was inherently
impossible for the contents of the bag to be in plain view,
and where only by prying into its hidden interior could the
police officer be sure that he was seizing contraband and nothing more.
Id.-Without Warrant-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter-Identification by Smell.-"In plain. smell" is not the equivalent of
"in plllin view," and in making a search without warr~nt, although officers may rely on their sense of smell to confirm
their observation of already visible contraband, however keen
their sense of smell, they cannot seize the thing they smell
until they find it after looking for and through the places

[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Searches and Seizures, § 43.
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from which the odor emanates, a search which they may not
conduct without a warrant.
[9] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Premises.-In a marijuana prosecution, the pl'osecution failed to
llleet its burden of proving that the seizure uf 111/1 rijuana was
lawfully made in the course of a search for sU>!P('cts, where
the J'ecord failed to show that it was discovered in the course
of a search of an apartment for suspects in hiding rather than
in the course of a general search for evidence after it was
known that the suspects were absent.
[10] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest.-A search is not
incident to an arrest when it is conducted at a place remote
from the arrest.
[11] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Time of Search
With Respect to Arrest.-To be valid as incident to an arrest,
a search without warrant must be "contemporaneous" or "substantially contemporaneous" with the arrest.
[12] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Time of Search
With Respect to Arrest.-A search that is substantially contemporaneous with arrest may precede the arrest, so long as
tbere is probable cause to arrest at the outset of the search;
but no such justification exists where defendant was neither
present at the place of seal'ch nor arrested until several hours
after the search. (Disapproving, to the extent they are contrary to the conclusion herein, People v. Luna, 155 Cal.App.2d
493 l318 P.2d 116]; People v. Williams, 189 Cal.App.2d 29
[11 Cal.Rptr. 43]; People v. Vice, 147 Cal.App.2d 269 [305
P.2d 270], and People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal.App.2d 63
[300 P.2d 194].)
[IS] Id.-Without Warrant-Incident to Arrest-Search of Premises.-When officers went to an apartment to make an arrest
and ascertained that no one was in the apartment, they could
not legally search it without a warrant where there was no
question of violence, no movable "ehicle was involved, nor
was there an arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be seized, and where
there was no probability of material change in the situation
during a time necessary to secure a warrant which the officers
made no move to do, although time permitted it,
[14] Poisons-01fenses and Prosecutions-Weight and Sufficiency
of Evidence-Unlawful Possession.-In a prosecution for possession of marijuana for sale resulting in a conviction of the
lesser o1fense of possession, the erroneous admission into evidence over defendant's objection of a cache of marijuana found
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 47; Am.Jur.2d,
Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons, § 46.

)

,
I

I

)
54

PEOPLE

v.

MARSHALL

[69C.2d

and unconstitutionally seized in bis apartment was error which
contributed to his conviction requiring reversal, where without
that evidence defendant could not have been convicted of the
charge of possession for sale, and where the other evidence,
consisting solely of a small 'luantity of marijuana allegedly
obtained from uefendnnt by :m informant whose reliability
was not established, whose 1II0vements the police officers admittedly could not observe without interruption, and whose
information was corroborated only by illegally obtained evidence, was not sufficient, in itself, to support the conviction.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. William S. Lee, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for possession of marijuana. Judgment of conviction reversed.
Daniel L. Schlegel, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assi<;tant Attorney General, and Rose-Marie Gruenwald, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant was cllarged by iuformation
with possession of marijuulla for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11530.5). He appeals from a judgment of conviction of the
lesser included offense of possession of marijuana (Health &
Sa!. Code, § 11530) entered after a trial by a judge without a
jury.
At 7 :45 on Sunday evening, October 30, 1966, four police
officers in an unmarked police car arrived at a vantage point
across the street from defendant'l> apartment in Huntington
Beach. They sent an informant to purchase marijuana from
one Mathews, l who shared the apartment with defendant. At
8 :15 the informant returned with marijuana in a cellophanety~e bag and told tIle officers that defendant gave it to him
free of charge. He also told them that the transaction took
place in the bedroom and that the marijuana he was given
was taken from a brown paper bag that contained more cellophane-type bags of marijuana.
The officers had neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant, but decided to arrest defendant on the basis of the
lMathew8, a codefendant at thc tl'ial, was also convicted of
of marijuana, but has not appealed.
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informant's report, Because the front door was a large sliding
glass door, they ruled out forcible entry as dangerous to person and property. When they could not find the apartment
house manager to get a key to the door, they called the police
department for an officer to pick the lock. A.n officer equipped
to do so arrived at 8 :30.
The officers knocked on the door several times, announced
their identity, and demanded entry. There was no response.
They then picked the lock, and at 8 :40 entered the apartment
with their guns drawn. They found no one in the apartment
after a cursory search of the living room, the bedroom, and
the bathroom. An open window with its screen removed indicated that the occupants had fled. One officer detected a sweet
odor similar to that of the marijuana defendant had given the
informant. In other narcotics investigations the officer had
smelled similar odors from marijuana that had been soaked in
wine. The odor came from an open cardboard box on the floor
inside an open bedroom closet. In the box the officers found a
closed brown paper bag, which, when opened, was found to
contain 21 plastic b1!-gs of wine-soaked, sweet-smelling marijuana.
The officers then made a thorough search of the apartment
until approximately 9 :30 p.m., but found no other contraband.
They remained in the apartment to await the occupants'
return. They arrested Mathews upon his return shortly before
11 p.m. and arrested defendant upon his return about 1 :30
a.m.
Defendant contends that the trial court conunitted prejudicial error in admitting the cache of marijuana into evidence
over his objection that it was illegally obtained. He urges that
the officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe that he
was present in the apartment when they entered it and that
since their entry was therefore illegal, the evidence was necessarily obtained illegally. (People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Ca1.2d
586 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10,432 P.2d 706].)
Penal Code section 844 provides that "To make an arrest
. . . a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the
house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which [the
officer has] reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after
having demanded admittance and explained the purpose
for which admittance is desired."
[1] By persistently
knocking, demanding entry, and identifying themselves for
several minutes before picking the lock and enterillg, the officers sUbstantially complied with the notice requirements of
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the statute. (See People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299,
302 [66 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489] ; People v. Limon (1967)
255 Ca1.App.2d 519, 522 [63 Cal.Rptr. 91].) [2] Moreover, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding
that the officers reasonably believed that defendant was in the
apartment. It is true that after the informant returned and
before the officers entered they did not constantly watch the
apartment; that the informant had told them that defendant
was planning to leave to attend a party; and that the apartment was dark and quiet. There was testimony, however, that
the apartment entrance was visible from the squad car, and
that one or more officers were always in the car before the
entry. The informant did not tell the officers when defendant
was planning to leave, and they saw 110 one leave the apartment, which was dark when the officers first arrived at the
apartment as well as when they entered it. The officers
believed that defendant was hiding inside, and the trial court
could properly find that their belief was reasonable under the
circumstances. Their entry therefore complied with section
844.
'
[3] The burden remains on the prosecution, however, to
justify a seizure of evidence without a warrant. (People v.
Burke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 575, 578 [39 Cal.Rptr. 531, 394 P.2d
67]; Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 486 [11 L.Ed.
2d 856, 858, 84 S.Ct. 889].) The Attorney General contends
that although in fact no one was in the apartment, the officers
could constitutionally seize the cache of marijuana in the
course of a search of the apartment for the persons they reasonably believed to be therein.
[4] During a lawful search of premises for persons
believed to be in hiding, police officers may seize contraband _ j
evidence" in plain sight" (People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal. I
2d 374, 379 [303 P.2d 721] ; People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal. I'
2d 690, 707 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365] [reversed on
other grounds].) Under such circumstances there is, in fact, ,
no search for evidence. (See Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. .
23, 43 [10 L.Ed.2d 726, 743, 83 S.Ct. 1623] ; United States v.
Rabinowitz (1950) 339 U.S. 56, 75 [94 L.Ed. 653, 665, 70
S.Ct.430] (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).)
[5] In the present case the marijuana was not in plain
sight. It was in cellophane-type bags that were in a closed
brown paper bag that was in an open box in an open closet.
The Attorney General contends that by virtue of the odor and
the iuformant'l:I report that the marijuana he was given came
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from a brown paper bag, the officer had reason to believe that
the brown paper bag contained marijuana. He concludes that
the marijuana should therefore be deemed to have been ill
plain view of the officer.
This contention overlooks the difference between probable
cause to believe contraband will be found, which justifies the
issuance of a search warrant, and observation of contraband
in plain sight, which justifies seizure without a warrant. However strongly convinced officers may be that a search will
reveal contraband, their belief, whether based on the sense of
smell or other sources, does 110t justify a search without a
warrant. " 'The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual infercnccs which rcasollable. men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences bc drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime [2]. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave
the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers.''' (Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610,
614-615 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 832-833, 81 S.Ct. 776], quoting from
Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 [92 L.Ed.
436,439-440, 68 S.Ct. 367] ; see Jones v. United States (1958)
357 U.S. 493, 497 [2 L.Ed.2d 1514, 1518, 78 S.Ct. 1253];
United States v. Mullin (4th Cir. 1964) 329 F.2d 295,297.)
[6] When officers seek to justify a seizure without a war2It is this point that is also not grasped by the dissenting opiuion
bcrcin. Tbat opinion completely ignores the rule that in the absence of
80me "grave emergency" (McDonald v. United States (1948) 33:> U.~.
451, 455 [93 L.Ed. 153, 158, 69 S.Ct. 191]) a search of a dwelling cannot
be conducted without a warrant except as incident to a lawful arrest
therein. (Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610, 613 [5 L.Ed.2d
828, 831, 81 S.Ct. 776].) Of course there is no dispute with the many
cases cited in the dissenting opinion that :lll officer may rely upon all
of his senses in determining whether there is probable cause to belie\'c
t.hat a crime has been committed or that contraband may be present.
Probable cause alone, however, cannot justify a search without a warrant.
" 'Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in
a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a seareh of that place
without a warrant. And such searches are •.. unlawful notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause.'" (Chapman v. United
States, S'Upra, quoting Agnello v. United States (1!-l2ii) 269 U.S. 20, 33
[70 L.Ed. 145, 149, 46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409].)
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rant on the ground that no search was involved, the objects so
seized must havc been" in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that vicw . . . " (Harris
v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 236 [19 L.Ed.2d 1067,
1069, 88 S.Ot. 992, 993] ), and must have been" fully disclosed
and open to the eye and hand." (State v. Quinn (1918) 111
S.O. 174, 180 [97 S.E. 62, 64, 3 A.L.R. 1500] ; see also Davis v.
United States (9th Oir. 1964) 327 F.2d 301, 305; United
Stales V. Barone (2d Oir. 1964) 330 F.2d 543, 544; Hiet V.
Um:ted States (D.O. Oir. 1967) 372 F.2d 911, 912; People V.
Kampmann (1968) 258 Oal.App.2d 529, 531 [65 Oal.Rptr.
798]: People V. Lees (1967) 257 Oal.App.2d 363, 368 [64
Cal.Rptr. 888]; People V. Allison (1967) 249 Oal.App.2d 653,
656 [57 Oal.Rptr. 635J; People V. Mandola (1967) 249 Oal.
App.2d 599, 604 [57 Oal.Rptr. 737J ; People V. Jolke (1966)
242 Oal.App.2d 132, 148 [51 Oal.Rptr. 171J ; People V. Davis
(1961) 188 Ca1.App.2d 718, 723 [10 Oal.Rptr. 610J.)
.
[7] A plain view of simply suspicious looking or unusual
objects does not justify their seizure without a warrant.
Thus in California V. Hurst (9th Oir. 1963) 325 F.2d 891, 898899 (reversed on other grounds (1965) 381 U.S. 760 [14
L.Ed.2d 713, 85, 8.0t. 1796J), the court held a seizure
illegal, stating: "All that was in plain view was a large brown
package about six inches inside the exposed vent hole. Upon
reaching into the vent hole and removing the package [the
officer J observed that the package consisted of two brown
paper bags which covered two plastic bags which, in turn,
covered a pillowcase. The officer then felt the pillowcase and
noted the weedy, leafy feel of the contents. There can be no
claim that the feeling of the pillowcase occurred in a "plain
view" observation since the pillowcase itself was surrounded
by four outer wrappings, all of which were rolled into a cylindrical shape. But only upon feeling the contents of the pillowcase d,id officer Hanks shout that he had' found the stuff.' "
(Italics in original.) In United States V. Vallos (D. Wyo.
1926) 17 F.2d 390, the court found that officers illegally conducted a search when they saw suspicious looking lumps under
a small ru~, removed the rug, and discovered packages done
up in burlap in the way contraband liquor was commonly
wrapped. Although one of the packages was open, no liquor
was visible until the officers took hold of the package and a
bottle dropped out.
In the present case the brown paper bag itself was not
contraband. Only by prying into its hidden interior (see Bie-
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Zicki v. Supe/'ior Cou/·t (1962) 57 Cal.2d 602, 605 [21 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288]) could the officer be sure that he was
seizing contraband and nothing more. 'fhe fact that the container was only a brown paper bag instead of a pa,cking box,
purse, handbag, briefcase, hatbox, snuffbox, trunk, desk, or
chest of drawers (see People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374,
378-379) is immaterial. It is inherently impossible for the contents of a closed opaque container to be in plain view regardless of the size of the container or the material it is made of.
A search of the container is necessary to disclose its contents.
A search demands a search warrant.
[8] Of course officers may rely on their sense of smell to
confirm their observation of already visible contraband. (See
People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860, 865 [24 Cal.Rptr.
752] ; People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d
167, 170 [307 P.2d 929] ; People v. Bennett (1967) 28 App.
Div.2d 526 [280 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259].) To hold, however, that
an odor, either alone or with other evidence of invisible contents can be deemed the same as or corollary to plain view,
would open the door to snooping and rummaging through
personal effects. Even a most acute sense of smell might mislead officers into fruitless invasions of privacy where no contraband is found.
Moreover, however keen their sense of smell, officers cannot
seize the thing they smell until they find it after looking for
and through the places from which the odor emanates. In
short, they must still conduct a search. They may not do so
without a warrant any more than without a warrant they may
set loose a dog of unerring talent to sniff out contraband they
reasonably believe will be found merely because they have
lawfully entered the premises for another purpose. "In plain
smell, " therefore, is plainly not the equivalent of "in pla.in
view."
[9] Moreover, even had the marijuana been discovered in
plain view, the record fails to show that it was discovered in
the course of a search of the apartment for suspects in hiding
rather than in the course of a general search for evidence.
"Assuming that the warrantless entry into the apartment wa~
justified by the need immediately to search for the suspect,
the issue remains whether the subsequent search was reasonably supported by those same exigent circumstances. If the
. envelope were come upon in the course of a search for the
suspect, the answer might be different from that where it is
come upon, even though in plain view, in the course of a

..~
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----------------general, indiseriminate seareh of closets, dressers, ete., after it
is known that the occupant is abseut." (Gilbert v. California
(1967) 388 U.R. 263, 274-27;") [18 hEd.2d 1178, 11R7-1188, 87
S.Ct. 1951] (Appendix to majority opinion).) There was testimony that the officer identified the closet as the source of the
odor when he entered the bedroom searching it for suspects.
The testimony specifically directed to this issue, however, consisb; solely of the following colloquy between the prosecuting
attorney and the officer who made the seizure:
"Q : Were you satisfied, Officer Epstein, that there was
nobody in that bedroom before you found the sack containing
marijuana'
"A: Yes.
"Q: It was after you were satisfied there was nobody there
that you found the saek Y
" A : Yes." We must conclude, therefore, that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that the seizure was
lawfully made in the course of a search for suspect.<>. Indeed,
the prosecution requested no finding of fact on this issue, and
at the trial argued that the seizure was legal on the sole
ground that it was incident to the subsequent arrest. (See
People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 418, 428 [67 Ca1.Rptr.
409, 439 P.2d 321] ; Giordenello v. United States (1958) 357
U.S. 480, 488 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1510,78 S.Ct. 1245].)
The seizure cannot be upheld upon that ground, however.
[10] A search is not incident to an arrest when it is conducted at a place remote from the arrest (see Stoner v. Caliform'a, supra, 376 U.S. 483,486 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 858] : People
v. King (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 308 [32 Cal.Rptr. 825, 384 P.2d
153J; People v. Henry (1967) 65 Cal.2d 842, 845 [56 Cal.
Rptr. 485, 423 P.2d 557] ; Hood v. Superior C01trt (1963) 220
Cal.App.2d 242, 247 [33 Cal.Rptr. 782]; People v. Garcia
(1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 345 [38 Cal.Rptr. 670]; People v.
Crll.z (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 861, 866 [40 Cal.Rptr. 841, 395 P.2d
889] ; People v. Shelton (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 740, 744 [36 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 388 P.2d 665]). [11] To be valid the search
must also be "contemporaneous" or "substantially contemporaneous" with the arrest. (See People v. Cockrell (1965)
63 Ca1.2d 659,666 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116] ; Agnello
v. United States (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 30 [70 L.Ed. 145, ]48,46
S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409] : United States v. Rabinowitz, supra,
339 U.S. 56, 61 [94 L.Ed. 653, 657]; Stoner v. California,
supra, 376 U.S. 483, 486-487 [11 L.Ed.2d 856, 858-859] ; PresPEOPLE 11. MARSHALL
--
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ton v. United States (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367 [11 L.Ed.2d
777.780.84 S.Ct. 881].)
[12] A search that is substantially contt'mporalW()US with
.arrest may precede the arrest, so long as there is probable
cause to arrest at the outset of the search (see People v. Cockrell, supra, 63 Ca1.2d 659, 667; Willson \'. Superior Court
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 291,294 [294 P.2d 36]; 110ft v. Simpson
(7th Cir. 1965) 340 F.2d 853, 856; People v. Griffin (1967)
250 Cal.App.2d 545, 552 [58 CalRptr. 7071; People V. Torres
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 864 [17 Cal.Rptr. 495, 366 P.2d 823] ; People V. Simon (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531]). No
such justification exists in this ease, llOwever, for defendant
was neit.her present nor arrested until several hours after the
search. (See People v. Egan (1967) 250 Ca1.App.2d 433 [58
Ca1.Rptr. 627 J ; People v. Garri.~on (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 54!)
[11 Cal.Rptr. 398].)3
We do not suggest that the officers in this case were motivated by a reckless disregard for the rights of persons. They
discussed the possibility of obtaining a warrant, but rejected
it as impracticable on a Sunday night. "[I]nconvenience to
the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers
and present the evidence to a magistrate . . . [however] are
never very convincing reasons . . . to by-pass the constitutional requirement." (Johnson v. United States, supra, 333
U.S. 10, 15, [92 L.Ed. 436, 441].) [13] Having ascertained that no one was in the apartment, the officers could not
legally search it without a warrant. ,. There was no question
of violence, no movable vellic1e was involved, nor was there an
arrest or imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the
property intended to be seized." (United States v. Jeffers
(1951) 342 U.S. 48,52 [96 hEd. 59,64,72 S.Ct. 93].) "They
made no move to obtain a warrant of arrest or of search,
although time permitted it." (People v. Egan, supra, 250
Cal.App.2d at p. 437.) "[T]here was no probabilit.y of material change in the situation during the time necessary to
secure such warrant. Moreover, a short period of watching
would have prevented any such possibility." (Taylor y.
United States (1932) 286 U.S. 1, 6 [76 L.Ed. 951, 953, 52
S.Ct. 466].)
STo the extent that People v. Luna (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 493 [318
P.2d 116]; People v. Williams (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 29 [11 Ca1.Rptr.
43]; People V. Vice (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 269 [305 P.2d 270], and
P(Jople V. lJominguez (1956) 144 Ca1.App.2d 63 [300 P.2d 194], are COlltrary to our cOllcJu~iollS herein, they are disapproved.
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We conclude that the cache of marijuana found in defendant's apartment was unconstitutionally seized and was erroneously admitted into evidence over defendant's objection.
Without that evidence, defendant clearly could not have been
convicted of the charge of possession for sale. [14] Moreover, the other evidence in the case was not sufficient, in itself,
to support the conviction of the lesser offense of possession
from which defendant appeals. That evidence consisted solely
of a small quantity of marijuana allegedly obtained from the
defendant by an informant whose reliability was not established, whose movements the officers admittedly could not
observe without interruption, and whose information was corroborated only by illegally obtained evidence. It is clear,
therefore, that the error contributed to the conviction. (See
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 {17 L.Ed.2d
705, 708-710, 87 S.Ct. 824] ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.
2d818, 835-837 [299 P.2d 243] ; People v. Parham (1963) 60
Ca1.2d 378,385 [33 Cal.R,ptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001].)
The judgment is reversed.

)

Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
This court, speaking unanimously in People v. Roberts
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 380 [303 P.2d 721], concluded that the
"fact that abuses sometinles occur during the course of criminal investigations should not give a sinister coloration to procedures which are basically reasonable."
The majority's neat but indefensible segregation of the
human senses-i.e., sight analysis is approved; smell and inferentially the other senses are rejected-results in holding the
actions of the police here to be basically unreasonable. I would
find the proeedures to be entirely appropriate under the existing circumstances.
To require a police officer acting in the performance of his
duties to totally disregard his olfactory reaction to marijuana
-a leafy plant notorious for its identifiable odor-is utterly
unrealistic. Equally untenable is a requirement that a warrant be obtained in this factual situation. As was said in
People v. Kampmann (1968) 258 CaI.App.2d 529, 533 [65
Cal.Rptr. 798] : "To require in the present case that one offieer go to obtain a warrant while the other remains camped
by the marijuana would further no recognizable interest; it
would magnify technicality at the expense of reason. "
..•
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The majority hold that "officers may rely on their sense of
smell [only] to confirm their observation of already visible
contra.band, " and again, that an odor cannot be deemed" the
same as or corollary to plain view" because this might
"open the door to snooping and rummaging through personal
effects. " The foregoing assertion constitutes a policy declaration which is totally unsupported by logic or precedent.
Indeed, the contrary view is expressed uniformly in California and virtually every other American jurisdiction. Not one
case mentioned in the majority opinion supports the proposition that officers may not rely upon the sense of smell to
provide justification for the seizure of evidence without a
warrant. 1
The two California cases cited as authority for the majority
views are People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860 [24
Cal.Rptr. 752), and People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149
Cal.App.2d 167 [307 P.2d 929]. Neither case, either in its
facts or law, is helpful to the majority; in both, the officers
were initially attracted to the scene through smell, and thereafter took additional steps to observe the contraband. That is
essentially the instant circumstance.
In People v. Foote (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 860, 862 [24
Cal.Rptr. 752], officers stopped a suspicious motor vehicle,
first smelled the odor of marijuana, and then when using a
1Iashlight to further investigate actually observed the contraband. The conduct of the officers was deemed reasonable, the
conviction was affirmed and this court denied a hearing.
In People v. Chong Wing Louie (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 167,
168 [307 P.2d 929], the officers smelled the distinctive odor of
opium before they entered the defendant's room, and this,
along with the subsequent confirmation by sight justified the
seizure. Indeed, said the court (at p. 170), the prior "information possessed by the officers before smelling opium would
have been insufficient to justify an entry, search or arrest."
Chong Wing Louie relied upon People v. Bock Leung Chew
(1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 400, 402 [298 P.2d 118], in which the
IThe majority, in their footnote 2 and throughout their opinion, fail
to distinguish between warrantless officers breaking into premises, in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, and those properly on the premises
who fortuitously discover contraband without searching therefor. In
Ohapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 81 S.Ct.
776], the officers originally entered the premises unlawfully and in
.A.gnello v. United States (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 31 [70 L.Ed. 145, 148,
46 S.Ct. 4, 51 A.L.R. 409], the search was clearly invalid because it
involved premises "several blocks distant from [the] house, where the
arrest was made." Here the majol"ity concede the entry was lawful.
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court grapplrd fort.hrightly wit.h our problem and reached
this conclusion: "The basic question presented is: When
officers deteet the odor of a substance, the possession of which
is made a felony, apparently coming from an apartment, does
this justify their making an immediate entrance into and
search of the apartment without first procuring a warrant.
Since the possession of opium is a felony officers who detect
the odor of opium are entitled to believe tha.t the felony of
possessing opium is being committed in their presence. We
ca.n see no logical distinction in this respect between something apparent to the sense of smell, and the same thing
apparent to the sense of sight or to the sense of- hearing. "
Again this court denied a hearing.
Case after case is consistent with the foregoing. For further
example, see People v. Burgess (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 36,41
[338 P.~d 524], ill which the court held that the "term 'in
his presence' is liberally construed [citation]. Presence is not
mere physical proximity but whether the crime is '. . . apparent to the officers' senses' [citation]. The 'senses' include
those of hearing and smell." And in People v. Clifton (1959)
]69 Cal.App.2d 617, 619 [337 P.2d 8711. it was held directly
that "An officer may use his sense of smell to afford him
knowledge that an offense is being committed in his presence. "
The federal authorities referred to by the majority are
inapposite to our problem: Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234, 236 [19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069, 88 S.Ct 992] [the object
was in plain view] ; Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 305
[thc marijuana was in waste baskets in two separate rooms] ;
Hiet v. United States, 372 F.2d 911, 912 [the bags were in
plain view]; Love v. United States, 170 F.2d 32, and Paper v.
United States, 53 F.2d 184 [both involved discovery of stills;
there was no indication of which sense was employed] ; Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 [91 L.Ed. 1399, 67 S.Ot. 1098]
[search of drawers approved; since only draft cards were
seized, we may assume no smell was involved]. In United
States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 544, the officers were held
properly on the premises as a result of using their sense of
hearing.
Only California v. Hurst. 325 F.2d 891, 898, and United
States v. Vallos, 17 F.2d 390, can give some superficial solace
to the majority, for the use of touch was there disapproved.
But factually the cases are distinguishable for the officers felt
leafy substances after they had already improperly seized the
packages; they were attempting post facto justification. Such
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procedure would be frowned upon even if sight were involved.
Reference to People v. Bennett, 28 App.Div.2d 526 [280
N.Y.S.2d 258, 259], gives no aid or comfort to the majority.
To the contrary. the court there approved seizure ill the hallway of a suitcase from which officers detected the odor of
narcotics. The court held tllat the proper seizure ill the hallway did not justify subsequent entry and search of a nearby
apartment.
Turning to other jurisdictions, we find universal approval
of the doctrine that all of the human senses may be used by
law enforcement officers and that sight alone is not the determinative test in ascertaining justification for a search without
a warrant. The leading case most frequently cited is Sp'ires Y.
Commonwealth (1925) 207 Ky. 460 [269 S.W. 532], in which
the court held" That an officer is not limited to information
derived through the sense of sight, but may rely and a(:t as
well upon information obtained through his other senses, is
thoroughly established. . . . A little common sense added to
the information conveyed by their senses of sight, smell and
hearing left no rpom for reasonable doubt by the officers that
defendant had [contraband] in his possession, and in their
presence. ,.
From that same jurisdiction the court in Davis v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1955) 280 S.W.2d 714, 716, made it clear
that "It is not necpssary that the officer should see the conduct constituting the offense if the commission of the offense
is made known to him by any of the five senses or combination
of them. In the dark, one might be struck by an assailant
without warning or notice so that the commission of the
offense would be made known only by the sense of feeling.
Likewise, th~ commission of an offense may be made knoWn by
the sense of hearing, as in the instant case. . . . It is not hard
to conceive of offenses the commission of which may be discovered by use of the senses of smell and taste. "
To the same effect is a decision in Utah Liquor Control
Com. v. Ma1!deles (1940) 99 Utah 507 [108 P.2d 512, 513] :
". . . if an officer becomes aware, through any of his five
senses, of one or more details of the commission of an offense,
and that detail or those details are of sufficient probative
value to notify a reasonable person that an offense is being
committed in llis presence, the officer may rely upon his
knowledge so acquired, and without a warrant, arrest the
offender or seize the property as the case may demand.
•
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Cases are legion upholding the usc of any of the senses by
law t'uforccment officers in ascertaining that there was probable cause for an arrest or a search and seizure. A sense of
smdl was involved in Massa v. State (1929) 159 Tenn. 428
[19 S.W.2d 248,249] ; Ingle v. Commonwealth (1924) 204 Ky.
518 [264 S.W. 1088, 1091] [in which the "atmosphere was
loaded with the perfumes of whisky' 'J ; the sense of hearing
was approved for an arrest or search in State v. Peters (:Mo.
1922) 242 S.W. 894; Dilger v. Commonwealth (1889) 88 Ky.
550 [11 S.W. 651J ; Goodwin v. Allen (1953) 89 Ga.App. 187
[78 S.E.2d 804J; Wiggins v. State (1932) 25 Ala.App. 192
[143 So. 188]; Faber v. State (1944) 62 Ariz. 16 [152 P.2d
671, 673] ; State v. McAfee (1890) 107 N.C. 812 [12 S.E. 435,
]0 IJ.It.A. 607]; any of the senses was approved in State v
Rigsby (1942) 124 W.Va. 344 [20 S.E.2d 906] ; Romans v.
Staie WHO) 178 ~fd. 588 [16 A.2d 642, 647J ["heard or perceived by any oth~r sense"] ; State v. Lutz (1919) 85 W.Va.
330 [101 S.E. 434J.
Thus it seems irrefutably clear that no prevail~ng law or
precedent supports the majority position. Reason and comm()l1
sense also dictate a contrary conclusion. Two simple illustrations will suffice to demonstrate the impracticality of limiting
discovery of evidence to visual conception.
Assume an officer is fired upon in a totally dark room, the
assailant casts the weapon aside and flees. There can be no
doubt that the officer could search for and seize the weapon.
The reasons relate to the use of his senses. While the room was
dark and he could see nothing, he heard the shot, smelled the
gunpowder, and felt the bullet graze his cheek.
Assume an officer, in searching a closet for a fugitive, comes
upon a corpse under a sheet. Certainly he could uncover the
body although he originally could not see it, because he
smelled the putrefaction and felt the shape of a body.
The facts before us fall into the same general category as
the foregoing hypothetical situations. The officers entered the
apartment, properly so according to the majority, in order to
make an arrest. They checked each room and found no one. In
the course of searching for a person or persons, one officer
looked in a closet, and while so doing smelled the sweet odor
of marijuana emanating from a package the contents of which
he could not see without unwrapping.
The majority seek to magnify the importance of the officer's testimony in wllich he conceded he was satisfied no one
was in the bedroom closet before he became aware of the odor.

I
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The officer's priorities were perfectly logical; he was searching for people, not objects. But reason rebels at the insistence
of the majority that the officer must ignore the distinctive
aroma of contraband merely because he failed to flush out his
human quarry and his sense of smell was aroused instead of
bis sense of sight.
I return, therefore, to my initial paragraph. The test,
according to Roberts, is whether the police procedures are
"basically reasonable." Prevailing law, and common sense,
indicate the conduct of the officers here was entirely reasonable.
I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was df'nif'd A ugllst
14, 1968, and the opinion was modified to read as printed
above. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.
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